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Using Twitter Bios to Measure Changes in Self-Identity:
Are Americans Defining Themselves More Politically Over Time?
Nick Rogers and Jason J. Jones
Abstract: Are Americans weaving their political views more tightly into the fabric of their self-identity over time? If so, then
we might expect partisan disagreements to continue becoming more emotional, tribal, and intractable. Much recent scholarship
has speculated that this politicization of Americans’ identity is occurring, but there has been little compelling attempt to quantify
the phenomenon, largely because the concept of identity is notoriously difficult to measure. We introduce here a methodology,
Longitudinal Online Profile Sampling (LOPS), which affords quantifiable insights into the way individuals amend their identity
over time. Using this method, we analyze millions of “bios” on the microblogging site Twitter over a 4-year span, and conclude
that the average American user is increasingly integrating politics into their social identity. Americans on the site are adding
political words to their bios at a higher rate than any other category of words we measured, and are now more likely to describe
themselves by their political affiliation than their religious affiliation. The data suggest that this is due to both cohort and
individual-level effects.
Key words: identity; social identity theory; social media; ideology; political polarization; Twitter
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Introduction

Because the distinctions are essential, we begin by
noting what this paper does not intend to measure. This
is not an analysis of whether the general American
public, over the past several years, is exhibiting more
politics-based behavior. By many measures, it is. Since
1970, the five presidential elections with the highest
percentage of voter turnout have been the five most
recent (2020, 2016, 2012, 2008, and 2004)[1] . Politically
motivated consumer boycotts are on a steady rise[2] . As
are campaign activities like donations, volunteering, and
wearing political paraphernalia[3] .
Nor does this paper explore whether Americans are
becoming more likely to affiliate with a political party.
Depending upon the data source, such memberships have
stayed flat or slightly decreased over the past decade[4, 5] .
Yet in a phenomenon known as “sorting”, Americans are
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becoming more segregated along ideological lines, in
realms like neighborhood[6] and cultural exposure[7–9] .
We do not ask whether people within those parties
or ideologies are exhibiting an increase in negative
emotions towards their political “others”—at an
alarming rate, they are Refs. [10, 11]. According to the
Pew Research Center[12] , 16% of Republicans reported
“Very Unfavorable” opinions of the Democratic party in
1994, but in 2017 that number had increased to 45%.
Likewise, Democrats who report “Very Unfavorable”
opinions of the Republican Party increased from 16% in
1994 to 44% in 2017.
What we do seek to measure is the extent to which
Americans are increasingly defining themselves by
political affiliations. We measure whether individuals are
changing their sense of identity, in a way that saliently
incorporates their politics.
This distinction—identity—is important. It represents
a threshold beyond mere attitudes or behavior. Identity
is an organizing, all-encompassing sense of self that
informs those attitudes and behavior: I must hold these
values and feelings because of this identity; I must
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engage in these behaviors because it is fundamentally
who I am.
An individual might endeavor to eat a plant-based
diet, but nonetheless not subjectively identify as a
“vegetarian”. When this is the case, such an individual’s
eating behavior is likely to be more flexible and contextspecific than an individual who has decided to claim
vegetarianism as an identity[13] . Similar comparisons
can be made between a “Gun Owner” and someone who
merely happens to own a firearm; or a “Bisexual” and
someone who occasionally has intercourse with someone
of their own gender. In each case, if a person has
embraced a certain attribute as central to their identity,
such identity will guide their future behavior. Individuals
seek to behave in ways that are consistent with their
identity; behaviors (and feelings and values) that are
perceived as inconsistent will be avoided or suppressed.
A person’s identity is a constraint on what they are
“allowed” to choose, in any given situation[14, 15] .
In the political context, a person for whom politics
is not part of their self-perceived identity may still
engage in political activity (online discussions, campaign
contributions, following the daily news, etc.), but would
feel relatively free to abandon those activities if they
become dull, exhausting, or otherwise problematic. By
contrast, an individual who defines himself as an Activist,
or a Politico, or a Liberal, or a Republican, will continue
to engage with current events, form firm opinions, and
“perform” their group membership(s), even if it becomes
detrimental to other aspects of their life. (This is because
identity, as we will further elaborate upon, is resistant to
change.)
The “identity threshold”, then, is conceptually subtle
but of major practical impact. If Americans define
themselves increasingly by their political allegiances,
their feelings towards political “others” can be expected
to become more negative, and debate on matters of policy
will become more emotional and intractable. Traditional
ideas of political persuasion may be of little use, because
changing someone’s mind on a particular issue would
require an adjustment to an entire sense of group identity.
Existing political polarization becomes more likely to
deepen than subside.
Numerous scholars have speculated, quite reasonably,
that the identities of Americans are becoming more
politicized[3, 16, 17] . But we are aware of no compelling
attempt to quantify this phenomenon to the extent that
it exists. This gap in knowledge is largely due to

the fact that the concept of identity—being abstract,
subjective, and dynamic—is notoriously difficult to
measure empirically. In the context of politics, how
may a scientist distinguish between a person who merely
engages in political behavior, and a person who defines
himself by it?
To explore whether political affiliation is indeed
becoming a more prominent aspect of individuals’
sense of social identity, we look to microblogging
platform Twitter, where a user can write a “bio”—a brief,
amendable personal synopsis that informs other users of
biographical basics. We treat these bios as a proxy for
an individual’s sense of identity—the way the individual
wishes to be seen in the social world. If Twitter users are
editing their bios over time to add cues to their political
affiliation, then we may tentatively conclude that such
affiliation is becoming more tightly woven into the fabric
of those users’ identity.
In examining millions of bios across several years,
we conclude that Americans are indeed amending their
individual identities to reflect their politics. But before
presenting these findings, some discussion of the relevant
concepts is necessary.

2

Background

One of the core concepts of social psychology, a person’s
identity, exists in the intersection of how the person
views himself, and how society views them. Identity
is the “character” that an individual presents to the
world, provided that such presentation is accepted by the
“audience” of society[18, 19] . A person’s sense of identity
is therefore their fundamental concept of who they are,
within the social world.
There are different classifications of identity. An
individual has certain traits that make them feel
distinct from other people—I am particularly tall, or
I am unusually generous. This is known as personal
identity. But people also define themselves by group
memberships and placement within networks of roles—I
am a mother; I am a doctor; and I am a Christian. This
is social identity. Personal identity gives an individual a
sense of differentness; social identity provides a sense
of sameness, or belonging. It is social identity on which
we focus here.
Social identity is often shaped by an individual’s
group memberships[20] . Although one might expect that
an individual’s groups memberships are constructed
around pre-existing preferences and behaviors (e.g., I
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admire Jesus Christ so therefore I shall be a Christian),
in fact the converse is commonly true (I wish to
be seen as a Christian, so therefore I will seek out
things to admire about Jesus.). Individuals often adopt
a desired group identity (or accept an ascribed one
like race or gender), and allow their behaviors and
preferences to be shaped by the dictates of that group. In
political science experiments, for example, participants
are easily persuaded to express support for a policy that
is antithetical to their personal ideology, merely by being
told that the policy was authored by their own political
party[21] . For many people, then, beliefs are dictated
by party membership, rather than party choice being
dictated by beliefs.
2.1

Identity salience

Because every individual is situated in a number
of groups and a number of roles, everyone has a
multitude of social identities. Each identity is evoked
and performed in some situations, and dormant in others.
Sometimes the appropriate identity is suggested by
the setting: Be a doctor at the hospital; a mother at
home; a mischievous friend at the bachelorette party. But
how does one choose which identity to perform, in
environments with no clear cue? A trip to the grocery
store, for example, or a cocktail party?
This dilemma is addressed by Stryker and Serpe[22] ,
who demonstrated that individuals maintain a
subconscious hierarchy of their identities, organized
according to which ones have the most general utility.
This concept is known as identity salience. A particular
identity is more salient if it is seen as being more
useful in times of social ambiguity. The more salient
a particular identity becomes, the more often it takes
precedence over other competing identities. It has
been suggested that political affiliation is becoming
a “mega-identity”[3] that organizes the other identities
underneath it[23, 24] . We seek here to investigate this idea,
by quantifying the extent to which individual Americans
are incorporating political affiliation more saliently into
their identities.
2.2

Tribalism:
Group polarization and the
backfire effect

Why might it matter, if identities are indeed becoming
more politicized? Because people with salient group
identities often fall prey to tribalism . The description
of American politics as tribal is currently trendy in the
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popular press[26–28] . But a coherent, unified definition of
that term is a bit elusive. Here, we mean tribalism as a
condition in which individuals subjectively perceive each
of the following: (1) Affiliation with a group defined by
clear boundaries; (2) the existence of one or more groups
of clearly-defined outsiders; (3) a zero-sum competition
for resources (power, status, money, etc.) among the
groups; and (4) ingroup loyalty as the paramount value
in the competition.
The trouble with tribalism is that, even when the
differences among the groups are minimal (or even
arbitrary) and the stakes of competition are very low,
intense (and irrational) animosity tends to define the
intergroup dynamics. In a classic experiment by Sherif
et al.[29] , members of a boy’s summer camp (Robbers’
Cave) were randomly divided into two groups prior
to their arrival, and initially kept separate from the
other group. The campers were told that they would
be engaging in competitions with the other group during
the duration of camp, and that small trinkets would be
awarded as prizes.
Benign ingroup pride was immediate—each group
named themselves (the Eagles and Rattlers) and
constructed a flag. But outgroup animosity started
quickly thereafter, and escalated from subtle to alarming.
Having still never met the rival campers, each group
formed elaborate negative stereotypes of the type of
boys they imagined the other group to be—cheaters,
sloths, and idiots. They behaved rudely to each other
when finally introduced, and within a day or two of
competition, they were having to be physically restrained
by the researchers from fist fights. Each group refused
to share a bus with the other group, for field trips. They
refused to dine at the same table. They accused each
other of sabotaging their respective camp areas, only
to be reminded by the researchers that each group
had accidentally done the damage themselves. Group
affiliation rapidly becomes internalized into social
identity, which is then performed enthusiastically and
defended fiercely. Judgment and perception are clouded
in a fog of tribal loyalty.
Also relevant to the political context is the
phenomenon of group polarization: Once a group


Although we treat tribalism here as problematic, the ability
to discern allies from outsiders may have been of benefit to group
survival in our species’ hunter-gatherer past, and could in fact be
an evolved adaptation[25] .
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membership is established, mindsets within that group
tend to homogenize and radicalize. As summarized
by Sunstein[30] : “In a striking empirical regularity,
deliberation tends to move groups, and the individuals
who compose them, toward a more extreme point in
the direction indicated by their own predeliberation
judgments. For example, people who are opposed to
the minimum wage are likely, after talking to each other,
to be still more opposed; people who tend to support gun
control are likely, after discussion, to support gun control
with considerable enthusiasm; people who believe that
global warming is a serious problem are likely, after
discussion, to insist on severe measures to prevent global
warming.”
In other words, if a person is initially inclined towards
a particular viewpoint, that viewpoint tends to become
more exaggerated and deeply held when the person is
exposed to a likeminded group, even if no single group
member’s viewpoint was exaggerated or deeply held to
begin with[31] .
If an individual is presented with information that
discredits their group, or runs contrary to its views,
the individual paradoxically becomes more entrenched
within the group. This is known as the backfire effect—if
a person is sufficiently invested in a belief (often because
the belief is woven into their identity), they will respond
to counterevidence by becoming even more certain of
their initial position[32] .
These phenomena combine to produce a predicament:
If political affiliation is becoming a more salient aspect
of people’s social identity, and salient social identities
tend to radicalize beliefs, foster animus, and resist
change, then society might be losing the most important
prerequisites for rational civic debate. Traditional
methods of political persuasion may be of little use.
Changing someone’s mind on a particular issue would
require an adjustment to an entire sense of identity.
Yet this is a difficult proposition to confirm, because
of the challenges in measuring identity. To solve
this problem, and conduct an empirical study of
the relationship between political ideology and social
identity, we look to popular microblogging platform
Twitter.

3

Data

On Twitter, users post brief messages—“tweets”, limited
to 280 characters—which may be read by other Twitter

users. Although users are able to adjust their privacy
settings so that tweets are only viewable by specific
people, Twitter’s default setting is public, and most
accounts remain publicly accessible. Although many
academic studies have analyzed the content of tweets,
little attention has been paid to another fundamental
feature of Twitter: personal bios. When initially opening
an account, each user is prompted to “Describe yourself
in 160 characters”. This biographical statement is then
publicly visible to other users. While users may type
anything they want into their bio field, some conventions
have developed. Individuals typically list nouns that
correspond to socially defined roles (e.g., father, mother,
scientist, and superfan). It is common for bios to be
comprised solely of such appellations. While in office,
former US President Barack Obama’s bio, for instance,
read “dad, husband, President, citizen”. Crucially for
this study, Twitter bios are also freely amendable, but
remain relatively stable. In our data, the average Twitter
user posts a tweet roughly once a month, but amends
their bios only once every year. This is consistent with
scholarship finding that identity tends to resist major
changes over time because their sole purpose is to
provide a sense of continuity or sameness across social
contexts and time[33] (If bios are analogous to identity,
tweets themselves might be similar to a person’s moods,
which often fluctuate rapidly.).
Beginning in March 2015, we created a computer
program to collect an automated, random 1% sample of
publicly visible tweets, as well as the user information
associated with each tweet as it appeared at that time.
For this project, we filtered those tweets to only those
from users with an American time zone as their time
setting and their interface language set to English . To
date, this has resulted in observations from about 20
million distinct users.
We then copied the text of the bios (ignoring the
tweets themselves) into a searchable Structured Query
Language (SQL) database. We repeated this process for
each year from 2015 to 2018, such that each year has
its own database with its own sample of Twitter bios
(When the same user was observed more than once
per year, we chose one observation at random to keep.).


This method undoubtedly includes some citizens of Canada
in the samples. However, because the population of the United
States is about nine times that of Canada, we think the observed
trends are most substantially attributable to Americans.
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Consequently, we may contrast the bios from each year’s
sample to measure changes in the words users choose
when describing themselves. We call this set of four
annual databases our “cross sectional” dataset. Of the
20 million total users who appear in the sample, about
3.5 million users were captured in all four years (2015–
2018) of our study. We therefore have a “longitudinal”
subset of our data, in which we can track specific users’
bios across multiple years.

4

Method

The Twitter bio is similar to a well-established clinical
measure of identity, the Twenty Statements Test (TST).
Developed in 1954, the TST prompts a respondent to
write out, in stream-of-consciousness, twenty brief selfdescriptions[34] . Those descriptors are then coded in
various ways depending on the aims of the researcher,
to provide a picture of the respondent’s sense of
identity. For example, the researcher might estimate
a respondent’s level of social integration by comparing
the number of social roles listed (e.g., mother, doctor,
or Christian) with the number of personal traits (tall,
intelligent).
We suggest here a loose analog to the TST, suited for
the age of big data and online social media. We treat the
Twitter bios as a self-report of users’ sense of identity,
and track over time the ways in which that sense changes.
We term this methodology Longitudinal Online Profile
Sampling (LOPS).
Consistent with our idea that political affiliation is
becoming a more salient aspect of people’s social
identity, and using our large data set of Twitter bios,
we explore the first of three hypotheses:
H1: Between 2015 and 2018, the prevalence of
users who include explicit political keywords in their
bios will increase.
To test this hypothesis, we face a challenge of deciding
what words constitute “explicit political keywords”. We
confine our terms to those that convey group membership
in a political collective with broad (rather than issuespecific) ideology. Although our resulting wordlist,
presented in List 1, may be imperfect, we believe it is a
fair representation of the spectrum of common, modern
political group identities.
Of course, ideology and political affiliation might
be signaled in any number of ways that are not
explicit. Such implicit signals may in fact be more
valuable, because they permit a person to indicate
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List 1 Explicit political keywords.
Socialist
Communist
Marxist
Anarchist
Leftist
Liberal
Progressive
Democrat
Conservative
GOP
Republican
Libertarian
Alt-right

affiliation to fellow group members, without suffering
a social penalty from “outsiders” with an opposing
worldview. (Political scientists have long documented a
phenomenon wherein individuals identify themselves as
“moderate” or “independent” despite having consistently
partisan views, presumably to avoid alienation from
outgroup peers[35, 36] .) Therefore we make a second
hypothesis:
H2: Between 2015 and 2018, the prevalence of
users who include implicit political keywords in their
bios will increase.
Here, the challenge of constructing a wordlist is
considerably more daunting. The number of ways
an individual might implicitly signal their political
ideology is limitless, even when confined to the written
word. Although future scholarship might introduce
more “objective” methods of compiling such a wordlist,
we trusted our intuition and experience as political
sociologists to choose the keywords in List 2.
At this point, we needed to validate our keywords:
Are users indeed intending them in a political sense?
Some of the keywords, in theory, might be used in
other contexts. For example, “woke” might be used as a
List 2 Implicit political keywords.
Feminist
Woke
Activist
Red pill
Men’s rights
Deplorable
Nasty woman
LGBTQ
Black lives matter
Blue lives matter
The 99%
BLM
MAGA
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sleep-related verb rather than a politics-related adjective;
“GOP” might merely be a typo for a word like “hop” or
“got”. To assess this, we took a random sub-sample of
100 bios with an explicit political keyword and 100 bios
with an implicit political keyword. We read each bio
and coded the relevant keyword usage as either “clearly
political”, “clearly non-political”, or “ambiguous”. The
analysis reveals that users are employing the keywords
in the context we expected. Of the sub-sample of explicit
political keywords, 96% of them were “clearly political”,
2% were “ambiguous”, and only 2% were “clearly
non-political”. Of the sub-sample of implicit political
keywords, 96% of them were “clearly political”, 3%
were “ambiguous”, and only 1% were “clearly nonpolitical”.
As a final design matter, we needed to provide some
measure of comparison to contextualize our results. A
longitudinal increase in political keywords in Twitter
bios may not be particularly meaningful, for instance,
if there has been an equal increase in keywords from
non-political realms. We investigate a third hypothesis:
H3: Between 2015 and 2018, any increase in the
prevalence of political keywords will outpace the
increase in comparable non-political keywords.
Here again, assembling such a list of terms presents
problems of subjectivity. In an effort to compensate for
this, we investigate keywords in three different realms:
art, sports, and religion. Each of these realms is a
useful comparison to politics, in that it seems likely
to be incorporated into an individual’s sense of identity
but unlike immutable characteristics such as race and
national origin, it is fluid enough that it might change
in salience over time. The keywords for each realm are
listed below in List 3.
List 3 Non-political keywords by category.
Art
Sport
Religion
Artist
Sports
Christian
Painter
Athlete
Jewish
Dancer
Golf
Muslim
Sculptor
Tennis
Buddhist
Designer
Basketball
Hindu
Filmmaker
Baseball
Baptist
Musician
Football
Methodist
Poet
Soccer
Catholic
Composer
Boxing
Mormon
Comedian/
MMA
Episcopal/episcopalian
comedienne
Hockey
Lutheran
Performer
Softball
Presbyterian
Actor/actress
Volleyball
Atheist
Playwright

By comparing the prevalence rates for these keywords
between categories and across time, we characterize
recent trends. We report prevalence in units of user
counts per 10 000 users. Thus, “40” corresponds to 40
users out of every 10 000, i.e., 80 000 matching users
within 20 000 000 distinct observed users. It is important
to note we are counting users, not words. A user counts
towards a category once and only once if their bios
contain at least one keyword. The bio “Conservative
GOP Republican” counts once as a user matching the
explicit keyword category.

5

Finding

Our results generally confirm our hypotheses. In Fig. 1,
we show the prevalence of keywords in users’ bios,
by category and year. These results are for the crosssectional dataset.
Indeed, Twitter users are becoming more likely to
include a political keyword, either explicit or implicit, as
part of their bio. For comparison, Fig. 1 also graphs the
prevalence over time for religious keywords. The other
categories have much higher baseline rates of prevalence,
and so including them all on the same figure makes the
slope of any given line too difficult to visually discern.
The prevalence values for each category of keywords are
listed below in Table 1.

Fig. 1 Prevalence of bio keyword categories, by year–crosssectional sample.
Table 1
Year
2015
2016
2017
2018

Prevalence of bio keywords by category and year.
PoliticsPoliticsArt
Sport
Religion
explicit
implicit
41
33
339
332
65
49
43
351
311
63
61
64
361
298
64
77
86
372
314
69

Note: Each value represents the number of incidences per 10 000
bios (“prevalence”). n D Approximately 10 million per year.
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The usage of keywords in the category of religion
and sports has remained essentially flat since 2015, and
art-related keywords have climbed only a small degree
relative to their overall usage. But the usage of political
keywords has climbed steadily. Of particular interest,
in 2018 Twitter users were more likely to describe
themselves in political terms than in religious terms.
In a nation that has traditionally been viewed as uniquely
religious among its peer countries, this is notable.
We are interested not only in baseline usage rates of
our keywords, but also in the extent to which prevalence
is changing. Figure 2 plots the annual change for each
category of keywords.
As Fig. 2 visualizes, the non-political categories
have shown only moderate and fluctuating changes
in prevalence since 2015. Both explicit and implicit
political keywords, by contrast, consistently became
more common. Twitter bios were 19.5% more likely
to have an explicit political keyword in 2016 than 2015;
prevalence grew by 24.5% in 2017, and 26.2% in 2018.
Implicit keywords became 30.3% more prevalent in
2016, 48.8% in 2017, and 34.4% in 2018.
Although the raw number of Twitter users defining
themselves by political affiliation is not as high as the
number defining themselves by their arts or their sports
participation, it is becoming increasingly common, at a
much higher rate than any of the categories we measured.
But is this effect attributable to individual users
amending their bios, akin to real identity change? Or is it
rather caused by new users joining Twitter who are more
political than the previous users, akin to a cohort effect?
We can answer these questions by limiting our sample to
the same Twitter users for each year—our longitudinal
sample of about 3.5 million users. Figure 3 reports the
prevalence and growth of the bio keyword categories, for
that longitudinal sample.
As Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate, the trends in the cross-

Fig. 2 Growth rate of bio keywords categories, by year—
cross-sectional sample.
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Fig. 3 Prevalence of bio keywords categories, by year—
longitudinal sample.

Fig. 4 Growth rate of bio keywords categories, by year—
longitudinal sample.

sectional sample are also evident in the longitudinal
sample. Over time, Twitter as a whole is gaining new
users who are more political than the older users, but
individual users are also changing to become more
political.
As Fig. 5 illustrates, this effect is also evident when
the keywords are disaggregated. Comparing 2015 bios
to 2018 bios, none of the specific political keywords
we chose showed a decrease in prevalence. Seven of
the 26 political keywords remained flat, but these were
keywords with a prevalence near zero (i.e., almost no one
was using them in their bios at any point). The remaining
19 keywords all rose in prevalence across the 4-year

Fig. 5 Prevalence of “explicit polities” bio keywords, by
year—cross-sectional sample.
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period.
As Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate, the upward trend of political
keywords as category is not attributable to any single
keyword, but rather is common to nearly all of them.
For the differences we measure here—both across
years, and across categories—we do not conduct tests
for statistical significance. The first reason for this is
theoretical. Because these are binary “count” variables
rather than sample means, we know no ideal way
to calculate variance within each variable and infer
a statistically likely range of expected values. Also,
because each set of observations might be partially
dependent on prior observations (e.g., because the
same person is captured in sequential samples, or
because a person at Time 2 is socially influenced by
Twitter bios they witnessed at Time 1), a fundamental
assumption of standard significance tests would be
violated. The second reason is a practical one: because
of the sheer number of observations within each sample
(i.e., millions of users), almost any observed difference
between or among samples will be “significant” in the
statistical sense. It is up to readers to determine for
themselves whether the differences are substantively
meaningful. We believe they are.

6

Discussion and Conclusion

To the extent that a person’s Twitter bio is a valid
measure of their sense of identity, Americans are
defining themselves more saliently by their politics.
This is important, because the formation of a group
identity tends to change individual behavior in powerful
ways. Through the phenomenon of “group polarization”,
people who begin with vague, weakly-held opinions
tend to become more radical and dogmatic when put

Fig. 6 Prevalence of “implicit polities” bio keywords, by
year—cross-sectional sample.

into like-minded groups. They also quickly develop
hostile feelings towards outgroup members. Rational,
evidence-based dissent tends to lose effectiveness within
the groups, and in fact make group members even more
invested in their original opinion.
To what may this increase in prevalence of political
group identity be attributed? Is a more politicallyengaged set of people joining Twitter for the first
time, making the aggregate site more political than
it was in prior years? Or are existing Twitter users
amending their profiles to add a political keyword
where formerly there were none? In other words,
is this a generational/cohort effect, or is change
occurring within individual identities? As our data reveal:
both. Comparison between the cross-sectional and the
longitudinal data suggests that (1) new entrants are more
politically-oriented than the older participants they are
joining or replacing, and also (2) individual people are
amending their identities to be more political.
This dual nature of the phenomenon, as well as
the effects it is likely to produce, portend a national
polarization that is more likely to deepen than subside,
in the short term. As Americans define themselves
increasingly by their political allegiances, their feelings
towards political “others” can be expected to become
more negative, and debate on matters of policy will
become more emotional and intractable.
Traditionally, a solution to the problem of tribalism
has been found in the concept of “superordinate
goals”. Rival groups can put aside their perceived zerosum differences when presented with a shared obstacle
that requires cooperation to surmount. In the Robbers’
Cave experiment, the Rattlers and Eagles were able to
work together and even form intergroup friendships,
once they were presented with obstacles that required
cooperation for shared benefit[37] . Particular to our
political context, some experimental research has
suggested that priming a national identity (American)
can mitigate partisan bias[38] . The attacks of September
11, 2011, for example, led to a period of bipartisan
focus on international terrorism. Yet in the current
political climate, such agreed-upon goals seem rare.
Democrats and Republicans seem to diagnose distinct
social maladies from each other, unable to even agree
on shared definitions of problems.
Limitations and future inquiry. Although we
believe our method provides a useful, digital-age
measure of individual identity that is similar to the
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seminal Twenty Statements Test, there are imperfections
worth noting.
First is the potential influence of “bots”. It is wellestablished that Russian intelligence sought in 2016,
and continues to seek, to influence American political
discourse through the creation of social media accounts
that pose as American users and spread divisive (and
often fabricated) political content[39] . It is conceivable
that our documented increase in prevalence of political
keywords in bios is partially attributable to a growing
number of these bots. However, our best evidence
suggests any such influence is minimal. To investigate
this possibility we tested random subsamples of our
data using “Botometer”, an automated tool to detect
automated “bot” accounts. Almost all accounts received
low scores. The mean for accounts in the longitudinal
sample was 0.6 on a scale of 0 (probably not a bot) to
5 (probably a bot). The growth rate of botlike accounts
fluctuated across our study period and could not account
for the increases in political identity reported here. A
full account of this analysis is included as the Appendix.
A second concern: Are our findings generalizable
to the American general public, or is the politicization
specific to Twitter users? To be sure, a sample of Twitter
users is not the same as a random sample of Americans.
In a recent study by Pew Research Genter[40] , Twitter
users are discovered to be younger, wealthier, and more
educated than the United States at large. They are also
modestly more liberal and more likely to say that voted
in the last election. So it is conceivable that Twitter users
are also more likely to adopt political identities than
the general population. More data would be necessary
to resolve this ambiguity. But we think that a general
politicization of social identity is consistent with the
other measures of politicization that we referenced in
Section 1—voter turnout, affective polarization, cultural
sorting, and so on.
Further, our sampling method samples tweets rather
than users. Users who do not use tweets—who may
have an account only to receive information or direct
message—are thus not observed. These users may be
systematically different from our sample of users who
do use tweets, and the present method cannot speak to
whether their self-identification is changing or not.
A third issue is the construction of our lists of
keywords. We were sensitive to the possibility that
certain “trendy” keywords could increase in prevalence
not because individuals are defining themselves more
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politically, but rather because the keywords themselves
are becoming more popular and supplanting “outdated”
keywords that are not in our lists. For example, a
hypothetical Twitter user might have had an Obamasupportive “Yes We Can” phrase in their bio in 2015, but
swapped it out in 2016 for a “Nasty Woman” reference
to Hillary Clinton. Because the former phrase is not in
our list, and the latter phrase is, our method would give
the misleading impression that the user had “politicized”
their bios, when in fact it was political all along.
We considered a number of methods that might
limit the amount of subjectivity of that process. We
searched for an adequate pre-existing keyword set, to
no compelling avail. We analyzed the Twitter bios of
several dozens of popular political figures, to see what
descriptors they commonly employed. To our surprise,
these individuals rarely used words that were even
implicitly partisan, in their bios . We contemplated
various Natural Language Processing techniques, to
obtain frequently-used words on political hotbeds such
as Reddit’s r/politics subreddit. But ultimately we
concluded that the utility of such methods would be
outweighed by the drawbacks and complications. Future
research may build upon these results by constructing
more comprehensive (or selective) banks of keywords.
It would also be fruitful to expand upon these
descriptive data and incorporate more layered analyses.
With demographic information on our Twitter users,
for example, we could conduct models to determine
which characteristics are most correlated with changes
in political identity. We could also analyze the users’
tweets over time (rather than merely their bios), and
analyze what sorts of rhetoric tends to portend or reflect
a recent change of identity.
Continued inquiry on the matter is important: It is
crucial to understand the dynamics underlying American
political polarization. The stability of a people is


For example, at the time of writing, Donald Trump’s bio
reads, “45th President of the United States” with a flag emoji.
Sean Hannity identifies himself as “TV Host Fox News Channel
9 PM EST. Nationally Syndicated Radio Host 3-6 PM EST.
http://Hannity.com Retweets, Follows NOT endorsements! Due to
hackings, no DM’s!” Joe Biden’s bio is “Senator, Vice President,
2020 candidate for President of the United States, husband to
@DrBiden, proud father & grandfather. Loves ice cream, aviators
& @Amtrak.” MSNBC host Chris Matthews defines himself as
“Host of @hardball M-F at 7PM ET on @MSNBC and author of
‘Bobby Kennedy: A Raging Spirit’.”
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dependent on some sense of unifying solidarity. Without
it, order is imperiled and chaos invited.
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Appendix: On the Question of Bots

In using social media bios as a proxy for individuals’
sense of identity, we make a fundamental assumption:
the bios are crafted in good faith by actual human beings.
Yet it is clear that the assumption is not completely true —
the existence of “bot” accounts is both empirically
documented, and anecdotally obvious to anyone who
is sufficiently active on social media . The relevant
question, then, for scientific findings from social media
data is this: Is the discovered phenomenon still evident,
net of the influence of bots? Put another way: assuming
part of the findings are attributable to bots, is there
nevertheless a significant part that is not?
In the current work, there is special reason to
wonder whether the bios of bot accounts are becoming
increasingly political. A Special Counsel’s investigation
into the 2016 US Presidential Election reported that
Russian Intelligence created a number of bots across
social media platforms, to sow discord among the
American public and weaken the support for candidate
Hillary Clinton[39] . Since these bots were disseminating
political content through tweets, it is reasonable to
assume that many of them were conveying political
content through bios as well.
Determining the extent of this problem is difficult.
Doing so with perfect accuracy is impossible. Some bots
make for convincing humans, and some real humans
make for convincing bots. Twitter has estimated that
less than 8.5% of its profiles are bots[41] . Some have
contested this number[42] . Some of those bots are
“legitimate”, such as those programmed to automatically
share weather updates or seismic activity. Presumably
only a small number of the overall bot population are
designed to influence political discourse. The platform
deleted about 4500 accounts that it deemed to be bots
from Russia or Iran in 2018[43] , and approximately
another 5000 in 2019[44] . These are insignificant
numbers relative to the Twitter population as a whole, but
it is safe to assume that some “perhaps many”—political


For convenience, we use the term “bot” to include completely
automated accounts, accounts that are a mix between individuallycrafted content and automated content (sometimes referred to as
“cyborgs”), and accounts that are entirely human-crafted but are
operated in bad faith by foreign actors disguising themselves as
American citizens.
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bot accounts evade discovery by Twitter. How many?
Enough to materially influence our findings that bios are
becoming more political over time?
To analyze this question, we conducted an additional
inquiry into our data. We began by taking random
100-account subsamples from the longitudinal group
and from each year of these categories of our crosssectional sample: (a) Users whose bio included an
explicit political keyword; and (b) users whose bio
included an implicit political keyword. This resulted
in 9 separate 100-user subsamples.
For each subsample, we entered each User
Identification Number into the online tool “Botometer”.
Botometer (formerly “Bot or Not”, available at
https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu) is a project by network and
computer scientists at the University of Indiana. (For
an explanation of its methodology see Varol et al.[42] )
The program checks the activity of a Twitter account
and gives it a score based on how likely the account is
to be a bot. Higher scores are more bot-like. Scores are
reported on a color-coded scale from 0–5, with scores
between 3.0–4.0 (“orange”) being viewed as suspicious,
and scores above 4.0 (“red”) assumed to be bots.
Botometer was not always able to report a score for
the users in our subsamples. In some cases, the User ID
Number was “not found”, which likely means that the
user’s account has been deleted since being captured into
our sample. (We have no way of knowing whether the
user cancelled their account themselves, or whether it
was involuntarily deleted by Twitter.) In other cases, the
User ID was not authorized, which likely means that the
account still exists, but has switched its privacy settings
from “public” to “private”. (Botometer, like us, can only
analyze accounts that are publicly viewable.)
It is unclear whether either of these “missing data”
designations is evidence of an account being a bot. In
fact, accounts that were “not authorized” seem less likely
than other profiles to be bots, because the purpose of
bots is to build as wide (i.e., public) an audience as
possible. And because Twitter users delete their accounts
for all sorts of non-nefarious reasons, it would make
sense that the number of “not found” accounts would
grow cumulatively from year to year. Nevertheless, we
include these designations in our analysis, for purposes
of a conservative estimate.
In Table 2, we report the results from the Botometer
analysis. For each subsample, we list the number of
“orange” accounts, the number of “red” accounts, and the
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Table 2
Group

Botometer results: Relevant counts.
Total Change
Not
Not
Orange Red
Year
count (%)
found available

Longitudinal
group
Explicit
politics

Implicit
politics

2015
2016
2017
2018
2015
2016
2017
2018

4

7

3

1

15

20
17
25
21
13
18
20
21

6
7
4
1
8
7
7
2

5
4
5
4
2
1
1
3

4
3
0
1
3
2
1
0

35
31
34
27
26
28
29
36

–11.40
9.70
–20
7.70
3.60
24.10

Note: For each group, n D 100: “Change” is measured from the
previous year’s value.

number of not found/not authorized accounts. For our
purposes, we are not so much interested in the baseline
number of these accounts in any given year. Rather, we
look to whether those numbers are changing over time.
If the prevalence of political keywords in bios is growing
from year to year, but the number of bots is not, we may
assume our measures of identity are valid. So the final
column reports the percent change from the previous
year.
There is no consistent trend in the number of bots
found within each group across the years. In two of the
years for the explicit politics group, the number of bots
actually decreased from the previous year. When we
ignore the not found and not available designations, the
growth of bots disappears entirely. Among the explicit
politics group, the combined number of orange and red
Botometer scores shrinks from 9 to 7 in 2016, then to
5 in 2017 and 2018. Among the implicit politics group,
that count shrinks from 5, to 3, to 2, and rises again to 3
in 2018.
Another way of measuring the growth rate of bots is
to calculate the mean of Botometer scores from year to
year. Table 3 reports those trends.
Here again, there is only mixed evidence of the
growth of political bots in our sample over time. The
mean Botometer score actually decreases, in 4 of the
6 measurable years. When the percent change values
of Tables 2 and 3 are compared with the growth rate
graph in the body of the paper (Fig. 2), one can see that
the annual increases in political keywords substantially
outpaces any increase in the number of bots, for any
given year. By our best estimates, then, our findings
that individual Americans are showing growing signs of
politicized identities between 2015–2018 are indeed net

Table 3
Group
Longitudinal
group
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Botometer results: Mean scores.
Year
Mean
Change (%)
0.623

2015
1.03
2016
0.92
–10.7
2017
0.86
–6.5
2018
0.79
–8.1
2015
0.72
2016
0.64
–11.1
Implicit
politics
2017
0.68
6.3
2018
0.77
13.2
Note: For each group, n D 100. “Change” is measured from the
previous year’s value.
Explicit
politics

of the influence of bots.
These methods are an imperfect match for a
challenging question. Botometer scores have known
limitations‘ . But it is folly to hold that any data from
social media are necessarily invalid merely because some
accounts are bots. There are confounding variables of
unknown value in any social-scientific endeavor. As with
any other study, we acknowledge those variables and do
our best to control for them.
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